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I. BRIEF HISTORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A- Self-Determination as an Evolving Legal Precept
Numerous scholars have traced the early origins of self-determination from
the Marxist precepts of class liberation to the Wilsonian ideals of democracy
and freedom. However, from the moment those words were first uttered by
Wilson there was an almost immediate retreat (most notably by United State's
Secretary of State Robert Lansing) out of fear that it might be seen as a rallying
point for independence movements outside the context of the Austro-Hungarian
and Ottoman Empires.'
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the concept of "self-
determination of all peoples" was incorporated as part of international
conventional law but within the statist framework of the United Nations
Charter.2 The push for decolonization in the 1960s, however, elevated self-
determination to a right and brought to full light the need to contend with its
humanistic components.
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I. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1995); HURsT HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1990).
2. C.f U.N. CHARTER, art 1, para 2 with art. 2, para 4.
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This shift in legal doctrine is evidenced in the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations which condemns
"the subjugation, domination, and exploitation" of peoples as contrary to "the
promotion of international peace and security."3  It similarly links self-
determination to the idea of full participatory rights without distinction as to
race, creed, or color. Equally important are the limitations it imposes on the
principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty when a state fails to meet its
obligation of a "government representing the whole people."4 Within the
international human rights movement, both the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights6 state that "all peoples have the right of self-
determination," which includes the right to "freely determine their political
status," to "freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development," and
to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources."
Just as international law has evolved from being solely concerned with the
rights and duties of sovereigns to include both individual as well as collective
rights of human beings, so too has self-determination evolved into a legal
precept benefiting "human beings as human beings and not sovereign entities
as such."7 The term "peoples" evidences the collective nature of the right. And
while much scholarship has been written on what the right of self-determination
encompasses and who are the "peoples" entitled to that right, states themselves
have been slow to acknowledge the relevance of this precept beyond the
classical colonial context.8
3. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the U.N G.A. Res. 2624, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. 28 at 121,
U.N. Doc A18028 at 121 (1970) (hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
4. Id.
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,1966,993 U.N.T.S.
3, 6 L.L.M. 360 (1967) (Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316 at 490) (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 999 U.N.T.S. 171,6I.L.M.
368 (1967) (G.A. Res. 2200,21 GAOR,Supp. 16 U.N. Doc A/6316, at 52)(entered into force Mar. 23,1976).
7. S. James Anaya, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996). See also The Right to
Self-Determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, at 31 (1981) (Aureliu Cristescu, Special Rapporteaur); Hurst Hannum, Self-
Determination as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTs IN THE WORLD COMMUNrrY: ISSUES AND ACTION 125
(Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1992).
8. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 1, at 67-155; Hurst Hannum Rethinking Self-Determination, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess. Supp. No. 40, at
142-43, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984). See also infra notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text.
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B. Self-Determination in Practice
Yet if we were to consider for a moment how that right has played itself
out in practice, most notably in the last six months, we may once again be
evidencing a shift in the conceptual understanding and scope of self-
determination sufficient to warrant a re-examination of group claims to that
right - in particular indigenous claims. This examination is critical given that
the evolution of self-determination as a legal construct is continuously shaped
by the realities of practice.
From an analytical standpoint, the application of this principle can be
traced back in time to the breakup of the German, Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman empires, followed by the demise of classical colonialism, and more
recently to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. Given the focus of today's panel, however, I will limit my remarks
to the United States - led NATO intervention in Kosovo and it relationship to
indigenous rights.
I. AsSESSING RECENT EVENTS IN Kosovo
My intent today is not to assess the "correctness" of the intervention as a
matter of international law or policy, both of which have been widely debated.9
Rather it is to consider what that intervention - and the entire Kosovo response
-might signal for the future recognition of indigenous peoples' right of self-
determination. I will begin with the United States position on respecting the
right of self-determination for the Kosovar people and then attempt to draw
some parallels to the aboriginal context.
In a recent address on the Balkan question, Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott noted that "how to translate th[e] phrase [self-determination]
into practice - and into peace - was one of the challenges at Versailles eighty
years ago, just as it was at Rambouillet six months ago, and just as it is in
Pristina today."' While self-determination at Versailles meant "the
dismant[ling] of empire[s] and the formation of a whole cluster of new nation-
states," Talbott states that the Balkans of today require "new answers to those
old questions about nationhood, statehood, democracy, and self-determination."
He points to the complexity of the Kosovo situation in particular given the
external suspension of Belgrade's power over the province, the ethnic
Albanians' desire for independence, and the United States' hope for some form
9. David Fromkin, KosovoCROSSING (1999); Michael Mandelbaun, A Perfect Failure: NATO's
War Against Yugoslavia, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999, at 2; Henry Kissinger, New World
Disorder, Newsweek May 31, 1999, at 41.
10. Strobe Talbott, Address at the Aspen Institute (visited August 24, 1999) reprinted at
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1999/990824-albot-aspen.html>
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of self-governing autonomy should Serbia free itself from the existing regime
of tyranny and oppression.
The provisions of the Rambouillet Agreement are a fairly good
representation of where the United States and other NATO allies stood on the
right self-determination for the Kosovar people. After paying homage to the
"sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,"
the Agreement calls for a substantial transfer of sovereign power from the
federation to the people of Kosovo." Among other things, it provides for the
adoption of a new constitution as well as the establishment of legislative,
executive and judicial branches of government.' 2
Although there were important departures from the Rambouillet
Agreement at the end of the conflict - most notably the absence of any
referendum after a fixed period of time to decide Kosovo's ultimate status -the
immediate goals prevailed. Kosovo is at the moment under the auspices of the
international community and with the assistance of various international
organizations is moving toward a United Nations Security Council mandate of
"substantial autonomy." 3 The United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo is the most "far-reaching" executive mission ever undertaken by the
United Nations and is specifically designed to ensure that the Kosovar people
have full participatory rights in the institutions of government under which they
live, which in turn will provide them with greater control over their cultural,
economic, and social developments.' 4
While noting that the "ultimate status of Kosovo is a question for the
future," Talbott also provides some insight into current United States thinking
on the future application of the right of self-determination beyond Kosovo. 5
It includes creating an environment in which self-determination can flourish
through a "pooling of sovereignty in certain areas of governance, and in other
areas granting greater autonomy." He notes that the trend is already away from
the "the old system of nation-states - each sovereign in its exercise of supreme,
absolute and permanent authority" - to one of regional if not global interdepen-
dence. Obvious examples being the European Union and various multinational
forces deployed around the world. The counterbalancing trend is the devolution
11. Rambouillet Accords, "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo" (visited
Feb. 19, 2000) reprinted at <http:www.state.gov/www/regions/Eur/ksvo..rambouilet.text.html>.
12. See id., Chap. 1 (Constitution), Chap. 1, Art. n (Assembly); Chap. 1, Art. III (President of
Kosovo); Chap. 1, Art. IV (Government and Administrative Organs); Chap. 1, Art. V (Judiciary).
13. U.N. Security Council Res. 1244, 401 lth meeting (June 10, 1999).
14. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution
1244, U.N. Doc. S/1999/672 (1999); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interm
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 (1999) (visited Feb. 18, 2000) reprinted at
<http://www.un.orgDepts/dhl/da/Kosovo/Kosovo3a.html>.
15. See Talbott, supra note 10.
of power as a means of accommodating "communal identities and sensitivities."
Two examples include Spain, which has transferred substantial autonomy to
culturally distinctive communities such as Catalonia, and the United Kingdom
with the establishment of new parliaments in Scotland and Wales.
Recent scholarship has similarly emphasized the contradictions inherent
in limiting the concept of self-determination to "mutually exclusive 'sovereign'
territories." Professor James Anaya states that such a limited conception of
"peoples" as it relates to a contemporary understanding of self-determination
"ignores the multiple, overlapping spheres of community, authority, and inter-
dependency" that actually exists in the world today.' 6 These concepts of
"autonomy" and "enhanced interconnectedness," while gaining new pro-
minence in the conceptual understanding of self-determination, are historically
represented in indigenous thought and identities. For instance, the founding
political philosophy of the Haudenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy under the
Great Law of Peace is built on the dual principles of unity among nations as
well as mutual respect for distinct identities or difference among societies.' 7
This conceptual understanding of self-determination in practice has its
critics. For instance, there are those who perceive the goal of autonomy - or
"diversity-within-unity" -for culturally cohesive communities as nothing more
than a train stop on the way to secession, pointing to the current thinking on the
future status of Kosovo. Others continue to equate the scope of self-
determination with the process of decolonization and independent statehood.t"
Indeed, secession may be an appropriate remedy in certain situations
where the "substantive aspects" of self-determination are not effectively
attainable by other means or where there is a persistent pattern of violence and
oppression against a particular group.'9 Examples abound from the East
Timorese to the people of Tibet. And it may ultimately be true for the Kosovo
Albanians. Yet it is equally true that appeals to territorial integrity and
sovereignty - which serve important stabilizing functions in the global
community - can no longer be used as a shield against continued violations of
16. Anaya, supra note 7, at 77-79.
17. See Oren R. Lyons, The American Indian in the Past, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 13,
32-42 (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds., 1992; See also Anaya, supra note 7, at 79.
18. This interpretation of self-determination is difficult to support given the recent turn of events
in Kosovo and elsewhere. See infra notes 40-1 and accompanying text. See also Anaya, supra note 7, at 77-
85.
19. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. See also Anaya, supra note 7 at 84-85; Ved
Nanda, The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL REGIONAL, AND
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 193 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds, 1980). Professor Anaya
reconceptualizes the principle of self-determination into a framework consisting of both substantive elements
and remedial prescriptions. For a further discussion of this framework, see infra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text.
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self-determination and other human rights. As Secretary of State Madeline
Albright noted in relation to the Kosovo crisis, a leader of a state "gives up the
right to argue sovereignty ... when he decides to ... unilaterally ... exile a part
of a community that lives within his borders."2
Once the substantive aspects of self-determination have been substantially
violated, an appropriate remedy -that is not necessarily secessionist in character
-must be considered and implemented.21 This is what the Rambouillet
negotiations had hope to achieve, what the U.S-led NATO forces believed they
had achieved, and what the current United Nations' mission is now attempting
to implement. Certainly one can only speculate whether the situation in Kosovo
might have taken a different course had international procedures and
institutions been in place to address early on alleged violations of a group's
claim of self-determination. As Professor Ved Nanda argued some twenty
years ago "the absence of guidelines for hearing and evaluating such claims will
leave little alternative to violence. 2
Perhaps this is a lesson learned from the Kosovo experience - a lesson that
could, along with recent events in places such as East Timor, pave the way for
the development of appropriate procedures and institutions. At the very least,
the Kosovo experience calls into question any lingering claims by participating
States that the right of self-determination is limited in scope by the theoretical
construct of territorial sovereignty. More importantly, it appears to signal a
change in the conceptual understanding of self-determination, which brings me
to the issue of indigenous peoples' rights.
Im. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLE FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION
In the past several decades, indigenous peoples have garnered international
support for their rights to live and develop as distinct communities whose
cultures and traditions are rooted in history and land.23 Their efforts have
brought about significant changes in both conventional and customary
international law.24 One primary example is ILO Convention No. 169, which
recognizes "the aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control over
their own institutions, ways of life, and economic development, and to maintain
20. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, (The PBS Newshour With Jim Lehrer, June 10, 1999),
(visited Feb. 18, 2000) reprinted at <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990610c.html>.
21. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
22. See Nanda, supra note 13, at 209.
23. See Anaya, supra note 7 at 45-58.
24. See id. at 47-58.
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and develop their identities, languages and religions within the framework of
the States in which they live."25
Even more far-reaching than Convention 169, however, is the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.26 In 1982, the United Nations
Economic and Social Council, along with the United Nations Human Rights
Commission authorized the formation of a Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, made up of five experts from the Sub-commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.27 The Working
Group's original mandate was the development of international standards
concerning the rights of indigenous populations. In 1993, a Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was completed and subsequently adopted
by the Sub-commission. That same year, the General Assembly proclaimed the
International Decade of the World's Indigenous People beginning December
10, 1994.28 These two events are conceptually linked in that the eventual
adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly is a major goal of the
International Decade. In 1995, the Commission on Human Rights established
an open-ended, inter-sessional working group to consider the various provisions
of the draft declaration.29
The declaration specifies all the various freedoms and conditions
necessary for a people to be fully in control of its own destiny and affirms,
among other things, indigenous peoples' fundamental freedom to
nondiscrimination, religion, self-government, control over lands and resources,
and protection of their identities and cultures without assimilation.30 The draft
declaration also recognizes their right of self-determination, stating in Article
3 that "Indigenous Peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." Article 31 further articulates that:
25. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convention
169), June 27, 1989, (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
26. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/199512, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
27. Human Rights Commission Res. 1982/19 (Mar. 10, 1982); E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, May 7, 1982,
U.N. ESCOR, 1982, Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc V_1982/82 (1982).
28. G.A. Res. 48/163 (1993) (commencing Dec. 10, 1994).
29. Human Rights Commission Res. 1995/32 (March 3, 1995). The meetings mark the first time
in United Nations history that organizations without official consultative status at the United Nations have
been involved in this level of United Nations policy-making. For indigenous peoples, this was an important
step in the recognition of their rights to fully participate in matters affecting their future.
30. See Draft Declaration, supra note 22. A similar declaration is under consideration by the
Organization of American States. See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
OEA/Ser/LV/.l.95, Doc.6 (February 26, 1997).
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Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to
self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including, culture,
religion, education, information, media, health, housing, employment,
social welfare, economic activities, land and resources management,
environment and entry by non-members.
Several states involved in the negotiations have expressed reservations
against the affirmation of indigenous self-determination on two primary
grounds: that indigenous peoples are not "peoples" entitled to the legal right
of self-determination and that self-determination as a norm outside the
decolonization context is at best debatable. For instance, in its 1995 Statement
on Article 3, the United States stated that "there [is] no international practice
or international instruments that recognizes indigenous groups as peoples in the
sense of having the .legal right of self-determination" and that "in the context
of colonialism, the term has been interpreted to mean the right to an
independent state. As a result, the draft declaration ... [goes] beyond the
principle of self-determination as set forth in the Charter and other international
instruments.' In a more recent statement on the issue, the United States
articulated its objections in somewhat broader terms contending that "no
international practice or instrument recognizes sub-national groups as. having
the legal right of self-determination" and further that the United States. has
"concerns about adopting a declaration which suggests that all indigenous
groups ... have a right to be sovereign, independent states. ' '32
In an attempt to find common ground, Professor Anaya has suggested an
approach to the issue of self-determination that distinguishes between the
principle's substantive and remedial aspects.33 Substantive self-determination
includes the right to participate in "the creation of or change in institutions of
government" as well as the right "to make meaningful choices in matters
touching upon all spheres of life on a continuous basis."'  "The substance of
the norm," however, "must be distinguished from the remedial prescriptions
that may follow from a violation of the norm, such as those developed to undo
colonization., 35 He notes that the remedies currently being explored in the
31. Statements of the United States of America on the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples to the UN Intersessional Working Group, at 5 (November 27, 1995)[hereinafter U.S.
Statements].
32. The United States Statement on Self-Determination to the UN Intersessional Working Group
on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ( December 7, 1998) (visited Feb. 18, 2000)
reprinted at <http://www.hookele.comnetwarriors/1998.html>.
33. See Anaya, supra note 7 at 80-5.
34. Id. at 81-82.
35. Id. at 80.
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context of indigenous peoples' rights do not suggest the formation of new
states.36
The substantive and remedial aspects of self-determination may in fact
take many different forms. One recent example would be the birth of Nunavut,
the newest Canadian territory, which provides substantial autonomy for the
territory's 27,000 residents, 85% of whom are Inuit. Similar attempts to
negotiate substantial autonomy for indigenous populations are being explored
throughout the Western Hemisphere.37 Regardless of the form, Professor Anaya
suggests five international norms that are essential to any substantive-remedial
scheme designed to ensure indigenous self-determination: non-discrimination,
respect for cultural integrity, control over lands and resources, social welfare
and development, and self-government.38
While indigenous groups have expressed support for these various
approaches to articulating the content of their right of self-determination, they
are equally concerned with any attempts by states to "qualify or define-away"
that right -a right which they see as the essence of their survival.39 This is not
to say that the prevailing indigenous views on self-determination are
secessionist in character. Indigenous groups have stated on any number of
occasions that they are not looking to dismantle nation-states. However, they
do insist on the right to control their own territories, resources, and decision-
making institutions, and to maintain their own distinct cultures.' In the case
of Quebec mentioned earlier, the Cree People have stated that if the province
of Quebec were ever to leave Canada they would "exercise [their] right of self-
36. Outside the colonial context, Professor Anaya suggests that the remedy of secession be limited
to situations where "substantive self-determination for a particular group cannot otherwise be assured or
where there is a net gain in the overall welfare of all concerned." id. at 84-85.
37. For instance, the agreement between the Miskito Indians and the government of Nicaragua,
which seeks to ensure greater administrative autonomy over their daily lives while at the same time providing
for fuller participation in the Nicaraguan government. See Anaya, supra note 7, at 78-79, 87-88.
38. See Anaya, supra note 7, at 97-125. Since Indigenous peoples have suffered both historical as
well as contemporary violations of their right of self-determination, they are entitled to an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 85-86.
39. See, e.g., Statement by Assembly of First Nations to the Fourth Inter-sessional U.N. Working
Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (December 8, 1998) (visited Feb. 18,
2000) reprinted at <http://www.hookele.com/netwarriors/1998.html>; Opening Statement of the Navajo
Nation Delegation to the Fourth Inter-sessional U.N. Working Group (November 30, 1998) (visited Feb. 18,
2000) reprinted at <http://www.hookele.com/netwarriors/l998.html>.
40. See, e.g, Supplemental Opening Statement of the Navajo Nation to the Fourth Inter-sessional
Working Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (December 1, 1998) (visited
Feb. 18, 1999) reprinted at <http://www.hookele.con/netwarriors/1998.html>; Statement by the National
Coalition of Aboriginal Organizations, Australia, at the 75th session of the International Labour Conference
(June 13, 1988).
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determination to choose to remain in Canada."-41 Moreover, it is worth noting
that secession is of limited practical value for many indigenous communities
given their location, size, resource limitations, and security concerns.42
With that said, it must be asked why indigenous peoples should be
expected to accept restrictions or limitations on their claims of self-
determination, even if recognition of that right meant political independence for
the small few that would benefit from such an endeavor. The Declaration on
Friendly Relations provides for just such a remedy when a state fails to meet its
obligation of a government representing the whole people. 3 Moreover, where
serious human rights violations persist and no other remedy is available
secession may be the only proper course of action. The Canadian Supreme
Court in its recent decision on the secession of Quebec reached a similar
conclusion, noting that:
[Ilntemational law . . . generates . . . a right to external self-
determination in situations of former colonies; where a people are
oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; or
where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government
to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development."
The Quebec situation further highlights the practical importance of
recognizing indigenous self-determination. Should the people of Quebec ever
vote in favor of secession, recognition of indigenous self-determination ensures
that the aboriginal peoples of the province are guaranteed the right to
participate fully in any negotiations affecting their future. While the
government of Canada appears to be moving toward a broader more inclusive
understanding of indigenous self-determination,45 other states, such as the
United States and Australia, appear to be at a standstill after almost five years
of negotiations on the draft declaration.46
41. Dr. Ted Moses, Grand Council of the Crees, Address at the Australian Reconciliation
Convention (May 27, 1997).
42. See Erica-Irene Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination, TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9 (1993).
43. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 3.
44. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1373 (1998).
45. See Statement of Canada on Self-Determination to the U.N. Working Group on the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (December 7, 1998) (visited Feb. 18, 1999) reprinted at
<http://www.hookele.com/netwarriors/1998.html>.
46. See the following internet site for various statements of participating states (visited Feb. 18,
1999) <http:www.hookele.com/netwarriors/1998.html>. See also U.S. Statements, supra notes 31 & 32.
IV. RESPECTING THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Yet, as I stated earlier, the Kosovo response may represent a shift in the
conceptual understanding and scope of self-determination sufficient to warrant
an honest re-examination of indigenous claims. As Deputy Secretary Talbott
noted one of the major challenges for the 21st century is how to translate the
phrase "self-determination" into practice and into peace. The Rambouillet
Accords and what followed thereafter were an attempt -however imperfect -to
articulate and uphold that principle for a "sub-national group" in a non-colonial
context. The seriousness of the injustices wrought on the Kosovar people after
failed negotiations served as the remedial justification for setting aside the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's claims to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
What we have then is recognition by the United States and others that the
right of self-determination is a fundamental human right of all "peoples," the
beneficiaries of whom are not limited by adherence to specious appeals to
sovereign boundaries. Equally important is the realization that self-
determination is not limited in its practical application to the act of secession,
but rather embodies in its fullest sense the right to live and develop as culturally
distinct groups, in control of their own destinies, and under conditions of
equality.47 These recent events suggest that at minimum Indigenous peoples'
claims of self-determination should be accorded equal consideration, since all
human rights -including the right of self-determination -are universal in scope.
Unequal application of this principle would impugn the fundamental integrity
of those opposing such rights as well as the international legal system itself.
Yet adhering to principles of equal rights and indigenous self-
determination will not lead inevitably to the kind of political instability and
disruption of territorial unity often alluded to in arguments against such claims.
Indeed, just the opposite may be true. Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes
notes that "the far more realistic fear" is that the denial of self-determination for
Indigenous Peoples will "leave the most marginalized and excluded of all the
worlds' peoples with out a legal, peaceful weapon to press for genuine
democracy in the states in which they live."'48
Let me just close by saying that in the last six weeks I have heard it twice
stated that the defining issue in international law for the 21 st century is finding
compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of
borders. In the context of indigenous claims, both the Draft Declaration and the
Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples currently under discussion at the
United Nations offer the best hope for finding just such a compromise -first
through the recognition of indigenous peoples' fundamental rights and second
47. See, e.g., Anaya supra note, at 77-88.
48. See Daes, supra note 35.
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through a process of negotiated settlements between states and indigenous
communities.
